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A resurgence of recent interest in fiscal federalism has been a source of concern among macro 
stabilization experts. They argue that a decentralized fiscal system poses a threat to macro 
stability as it is incompatible with prudent monetary and fiscal management.  
This paper addresses these concerns by taking a simple neo-institutional economics cum 
econometric analysis perspective. This analysis enables the paper to conclude that, contrary to a 
common misconception, fiscal decentralization is associated with improved fiscal performance 
and better functioning of internal common market 
  Fiscal policy coordination represents an important challenge for federal systems. In this 
context, fiscal rules and institutions provide a useful framework but not necessary a solution to 
this challenge. Fiscal rules binding on all levels can help sustain political commitment in 
countries having coalitions or fragmented regimes in power. Coordinating institutions help in the 
use of moral suasion to encourage a coordinated response.   Industrialized countries experiences 
also show that unilaterally imposed federal controls and constraints on sub-national governments 
typically do not work. Instead, societal norms based on fiscal conservatism such as the Swiss 
referenda and political activism of the electorate play important roles. Ultimately capital markets 
and bond-rating agencies provide more effective discipline on fiscal policy. In this context, it is 
important not to backstop state and local debt and not to allow ownership of the banks by any 
level of government. Transparency of the budgetary process and institutions, accountability to the 
electorate and general availability of comparative data encourages fiscal discipline.    
Fiscal decentralization poses significant challenges for macroeconomic management. 
These challenges require careful design of monetary and fiscal institutions to overcome adverse 
incentives associated with the “common property” resource management problems or with rent 
seeking behaviors. Experiences of federal countries indicate significant learning and adaptation of 
fiscal systems to create incentives compatible with fair play and to overcome incomplete 
contracts.  This explains why that decentralized fiscal systems appear to do better than centralized 
fiscal systems on most aspects of monetary and fiscal policy management and transparent and 
accountable governance. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  A large and growing number of countries around the globe are re-examining the roles of 
various orders of government and their partnerships with the private sector and the civil society 
with a view to creating governments that work and serve their people (see Shah, 1997 for 
motivations for a change). This rethinking has led to a resurgence of interest in fiscal federalism 
principles and practices as federal systems are seen to provide safeguards both against the threat 
of centralized exploitation as well as decentralized opportunistic behavior while bringing decision 
making closer to the people. In fact federalism represents either “coming together” or “holding 
together” of constituent geographic units to take advantage of the greatness and smallness of 
nations as in a  flat (globalized) world nation states are observed to be too large to address small 
things in life and too small to address large tasks. But federal fiscal systems to accommodate 
“coming together” or “holding together” according to some influential writers pose a threat to 
macro stability. They argue that decentralized governance structure is incompatible with prudent 
fiscal management and even regional fiscal equity (see e.g. Prud’homme 1995, Tanzi, 1996).  
This paper investigates the conceptual and empirical bases of these arguments. More specifically, 
the paper addresses the following questions: 
 
•  Are there greater risks of macroeconomic mismanagement and instability with 
decentralized fiscal systems (federal vs. unitary countries)?  
•  What has been the experience to-date in macroeconomic management in federal vs. 
unitary countries? Or what has been the impact of decentralization on fiscal discipline 
and macro stability?   
 
To address the above questions, the paper takes a simple institutional cum econometric 
analysis perspective. The strengths and weaknesses of fiscal and monetary policy institutions 
                                                      
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Annual Congress of the International Institute 
of Public Finance, August 22-25, Jeju Island, Korea. The author is grateful to Professor Jurgen von Hagen 
for suggesting this topic and Javier Arze and Sarwat Jahan for research assistance. The views expressed 
here are those of the author alone and may not be attributed to the World Bank. Please address all 
comments to: ashah@worldbank.org.   3
under alternate fiscal regimes are examined drawing upon neo-institutional economics 
perspectives on fiscal institutions (see von Hagen, 2002, 2005 and Von Hagen, Hallet and 
Strauch, 2002). A neo-institutional economics perspective aims to reduce transactions costs for 
citizens (principals) in inducing compliance with their mandates by various orders of 
governments (agents). A fiscal system that creates countervailing institutions to limit the 
opportunistic behavior of various agents and empowers principals to take corrective action is 
expected to result in superior fiscal outcomes. In the context of this paper, the relevant question 
then is what type of fiscal system (centralized or decentralized) offers greater potential for 
contract enforcement or rules or restraints to discourage imprudent fiscal management. The paper 
undertakes a qualitative review of institutional arrangements for monetary and fiscal policy in 
federal and unitary countries.       This is supplemented by two country case studies and a broader 
cross-country econometric analysis to examine fiscal outcomes under alternate fiscal systems. 
These results are used to draw some general lessons of public policy interest.    
The paper concludes that, contrary to a common misconception, decentralized fiscal 
systems offer a greater potential for improved macroeconomic governance and regional fiscal 
equity than centralized fiscal systems .While empirical evidence on these questions is quite weak, 
nevertheless it further supports the conclusion that fiscal decentralization is associated with 
improved fiscal performance and better functioning of the internal common market.  This is to be 
expected as decentralized fiscal systems require greater clarity in the roles of various players 
(centers of decision making), transparency in the rules and greater care in the design of 
institutions that govern interactions to ensure fair play and limit opportunities for rent seeking. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional environment for 
macroeconomic management. This is elaborated separately for monetary and fiscal policies. 
Section 3 reviews internal common market and economic union considerations. Section 4 
provides conclusions. A final section draws some general and institutional lessons for enhancing 
the quality of macroeconomic governance. 
 
2.  Institutional Environment for Macroeconomic Management 
 
  Using Musgrave’s trilogy of public functions, namely allocation, redistribution and 
stabilization, the fiscal federalism literature has traditionally reached a broad consensus that while 
the former function can be assigned to lower levels of government, the latter two functions are 
more appropriate for assignment to the national government. Thus macroeconomic management - 
especially stabilization policy -- was seen as clearly a central function (see e.g. Musgrave, 1983:   4
516; Oates, 1972). The stabilization function was considered inappropriate for sub-national 
assignment as (a) raising debt at the local level would entail higher regional costs but benefits for 
such stabilization would spill beyond regional borders and as a result too little stabilization would 
be provided; (b) monetization of local debt will create inflationary pressures and pose a threat for 
price stability; (c) currency stability requires that both monetary and fiscal policy functions be 
carried out by the center alone; and (d) cyclical shocks are usually national in scope (symmetric 
across all regions) and therefore require a national response.   The above views have been 
challenged by several writers (see e.g. Scott, 1964; Dafflon, 1977; Sheikh and Winer, 1977; 
Gramlich, 1987: Walsh, 1992; Biehl, 1994; Shah, 1994; Mihaljek, 1995; Sewell, 1995; Huther 
and Shah, 1996) on theoretical and empirical grounds yet they continue to command considerable 
following. An implication that is often drawn is that decentralization of the public sector 
especially in developing countries poses significant risks for the “aggravation of macroeconomic 
problems” (Tanzi, 1996, p.305).  
  To form a perspective on this issue, we reflect in the following on the theoretical and 
empirical underpinnings of the institutional framework required for monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
2.1 Institutional Setting for Monetary Policy 
 
  Monetary policy is concerned with control over the level and rate of change of nominal 
variables such as the price level, monetary aggregates, exchange rate and nominal GDP. The 
control over these nominal variables to provide for a stable macro environment is commonly 
agreed to be a central function and monetary policy is centralized in all nation states, federal and 
unitary alike. Nevertheless, there are occasional arguments to add a regional dimension to the 
design and implementation of monetary policies. For example Mundell (1968) argues that an 
optimal currency area may be smaller than the nation state in some federations such as Canada 
and USA and in such circumstances, the differential impact of exchange rate policies may be 
inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of fair treatment of regions. Further 
complications arise when the federal government raises debt domestically, but provincial 
governments borrow from abroad: This is the case in Canada as federal exchange rate policies 
affect provincial debt servicing. Similarly Buchanan (1997) argues against the establishment of a 
confederal central bank such as the European Union Central Bank as it negates the spirit of 
competitive federalism.   
  In a centralized monetary policy environment, Barro (1996) has cautioned that a stable 
macro environment may not be achievable without a strong commitment to price stability by the   5
monetary authority. This is because if people anticipate growth in money supply to counteract a 
recession, the lack of such response will deepen recession. The credibility of a strong 
commitment to price stability can be established by consistently adhering to formal rules such as 
a fixed exchange rate or to monetary rules.  Argentina’s 1991 Convertibility Law establishing 
parity in the value of the peso in terms of the US dollar and Brazil’s 1994 Real Plan helped 
achieve a measure of this level of credibility. Argentina’s central bank strengthened credibility of 
this commitment by enduring a severe contraction in the monetary base during the period 
December 1994 to March 1995 as speculative reactions to the Mexican crisis resulted in a decline 
in its foreign exchange reserves.  Alternately, guaranteeing independence from all levels of the 
government for a central bank whose principal mission is price stability could establish the 
credibility of such a commitment (Barro, 1996, Shah, 1994, p.11). Barro considers the focus on 
price stability so vital that he regards an ideal central banker as one who is not necessarily a good 
macro economist but one whose commitment to price stability is unshakable. He said, “The ideal 
central banker should always appear somber in public, never tell any jokes, and complain 
continually about the dangers of inflation” (1996, p.58).  Empirical studies show that that the 
three most independent central banks (the National Bank of Switzerland - the Swiss Central 
Bank, Bundesbank of Germany, and the US Federal Reserve Board) over the period 1955 to 
1988, had average inflation rates of 4.4 percent compared to 7.8 percent for the three least 
independent banks (New Zealand until 1989, Spain and Italy). The inflation rate in the former 
countries further showed lower volatility.  The same studies also show that the degree of central 
bank independence is unrelated to the average rate of growth and average rate of unemployment. 
Thus Barro argues that a “more independent central bank appears to be all gain and no pain” 
(1996, p.57). The European Union has recognized this principle by establishing an independent 
European Central Bank.  The critical question then is whether or not independence of the central 
bank is compromised under a decentralized fiscal system.  One would expect, a priori, that the 
central bank would have greater stakes and independence under a decentralized system since such 
a system would require clarification of the rules under which a central bank operates, its functions 
and its relationships with various governments.  For example, when Brazil in 1988 introduced a 
decentralized federal constitution, it significantly enhanced the independence of the central bank 
(Shah, 1991, Bomfim and Shah, 1994). Yet, independence of the central bank in Brazil remains 
relatively weak compared to other federal countries (see Huther and Shah, 1996).  On the other 
hand, in centralized countries the role of the central bank is typically shaped and influenced by 
the Ministry of Finance.  In one extreme case, the functions of the central bank of the UK (a 
unitary state), the Bank of England, are not defined by law but have developed over time by a   6
tradition fostered by the UK Treasury. Only in May 1997 has the newly elected labor party 
government of Prime Minister Tony Blair assured the Bank of England a free hand in its pursuit 
of price stability. Such independence may still on occasions be compromised as the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer still retains a presence on the board of directors as a voting member. New Zealand 
and France (unitary states) have lately recognized the importance of central bank independence 
for price stability and have granted independence to their central banks. The 1989 Reserve Bank 
Act of New Zealand mandates price stability as the only function of the central bank and 
expressly prohibits the government from involvement in monetary policy. The People’s Bank of 
China, on the other hand, does not enjoy such independence and often works as a development 
bank or as an agency for central government “policy lending” and in the process undermines its 
role of ensuring price stability (see World Bank, 1995 and Ma, 1995).  For monetary policy, it 
has only the authority to implement the policies authorized by the State Council.   The Law of the 
People’s Bank of China, 1995, article 7 states that its role is simply to “implement monetary 
policies under the leadership of the State Council” (see Chung and Tongzon, 2004). 
  For a systematic examination of this question, Huther and Shah (1996) relate the 
evidence presented in Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) on central bank independence for 80 
countries to indices of fiscal decentralization for the same countries. Cukierman et al. assess 
independence of a central bank based upon an examination of 16 statutory aspects of central bank 
operations including the terms of office for the chief executive officer, the formal structure of 
policy formulation, the bank’s objectives as stated in its charter, and limitations on lending to the 
government. Huther and Shah (1996) find a weak but positive association between fiscal 
decentralization and central bank independence confirming our a priori judgment that central 
bank independence is strengthened under decentralized systems.  Table 1 uses a cross section of 
40 countries for the period 1995-2000 to provide econometric analysis of the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on central bank independence. The results confirm the positive impact of fiscal 
decentralization and federalism on central bank independence.    
  Increases in the monetary base caused by the central bank’s bailout of failing state and 
non-state banks represent occasionally an important source of monetary instability and a 
significant obstacle to macro economic management. In Pakistan, a centralized federation, both 
the central and provincial governments have, in the past, raided nationalized banks.  In Brazil, a 
decentralized federation, state banks in the past made loans to their own governments without due 
regard for their profitability and risks causing the so called $100 billion state debt crisis in 1995. 
Brazil, nevertheless later dealt with this issue head on with successful privatization of state-
owned banks in late 1990s and through prohibition of government borrowing from state banks or   7
from the central bank (Levy, 2005).  Thus a central bank role in ensuring arms length transactions 
between governments and the banking sector would enhance monetary stability regardless of the 
degree of decentralization of the fiscal system. 
  Available empirical evidence suggests that such arms length transactions are more 
difficult to achieve in countries with a centralized structure of governance than under a 
decentralized structure with a larger set of players.  This is because a decentralized structure 
requires greater clarity in the roles of various public players, including the central bank.   No 
wonder one finds that the four central banks most widely acknowledged to be independent (Swiss 
Central Bank, Bundesbank of Germany, Central Bank of Austria and the United States Federal 
Reserve Board)  have all been the products of highly decentralized federal fiscal structures. It is 
interesting to note that the independence of the Bundesbank is not assured by the German 
Constitution. The Bundesbank Law providing such independence also stipulates that the central 
bank has an obligation to support the economic policy of the federal government.  In practice, the 
Bundesbank has primarily sought to establish its independence by focusing on price stability 
issues. This was demonstrated in the 1990s by its decision to raise interest rates to finance 
German unification in spite of the adverse impacts on federal debt obligations (see also Biehl, 
1994). 
  The Swiss Federal Constitution (article 39) assigns monetary policy to the federal 
government. The federal government has, however, delegated the conduct of monetary policy to 
the Swiss National Bank, a private limited company regulated by a special law. The National 
Bank Act of 1953 has granted independence in the conduct of monetary policy to the Swiss 
National Bank although the bank is required to conduct its policy in the general interest of the 
country. It is interesting to note that the Swiss National Bank allocates a portion of its profits to 
cantons to infuse a sense of regional ownership and participation in the conduct of monetary 
policy (Gygi, 1991).    
  This paper also examined empirically some additional questions on the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on monetary stability. These included the impact of fiscal decentralization; 
growth of the money supply; control of inflation; and inflation and macroeconomic balances. 
Regression results reported in Table 2 show that growth of the money supply is primarily 
determined by central bank independence and fiscal decentralization has an insignificant positive 
impact.  Similarly, fiscal decentralization has a positive but insignificant impact on price inflation 
(Table 3). Finally, the impact of fiscal decentralization on inflation and macroeconomic balances 
was found to be insignificant (Table 4).      
   8
Monetary Management in Brazil: a decade of successful reforms 
 
  Brazil had a long history of state ownership of the banking system and imprudent 
borrowing by governments from their own banks and subsequent bailouts. This tradition 
undermined fiscal discipline and macro-stability. Of lately the federal system has been able to come 
to grips with these issues.  To this end, Brazil has given substantial independence to the Central 
Bank of Brazil and also adopted a variety of institutions to promote arms-length transactions 
among governments and the financial sector institutions.  In August 1996 the federal government 
launched the Program to Reduce State Involvement with Banking Activities (PROES) that 
offered state governments support in financing the costs of preparing state banks for privatization, 
liquidation, or restructuring of state banks, some of which were converted to development 
agencies; as well as the voluntary alternative to delegate the control of the overall process of 
reform to the federal government (Beck, Crivelli and Summerhill, 2003). Government efforts 
have successfully led to a reduction in the number of state-owned banks; among some of the ones 
privatized are former state banks of: Rio de Janeiro (BANERJ) in June 1997; Minas Gerias 
(BEMGE) in September 1998; Pernambuco (BANDEPE) in November 1998; Bahia (BANEB) 
June 1999; Paraná (BANESTADO) October 2000;, Sao Paulo (BANESPA) November 2000; 
Paraíba (PARAIBAN) November 2001; Goiás (BEG) in December 2001; and  Amazonas (BEA) 
in January 2002.
2  
More recently, the Law of Fiscal Responsibility enacted in 2000 (LRF, 2000) prohibits 
government borrowing from own banks or the central bank. It requires that all new government 
borrowing receive the technical approval of the Central Bank and the approval of the Senate. 
Borrowing operations are prohibited altogether during a period of 180 days before the end of 
incumbents’ government mandate (Afonso and de Mello, 2000). For capital markets, the LRF 
declares that financing operations in violation of debt ceilings would not be legally valid and 
amounts borrowed should be repaid fully without interest. Unpaid interests due nullification 
constitute a loss to the lender. Overall Brazil has achieved monetary discipline since 1997 and 
sustained price stability since 1995.  
 
Monetary Management in China: Still Muddling Through 
 
  China is a unitary country and this unitary character is strongly reinforced through its one-
party system. China until the early 1980s had an unsophisticated banking system comprised of the   9
People's Bank of China (PBC), along with a few specialized banks such as the People’s 
Construction Bank - an arm of the Ministry of Finance.  The central budget and the banking system 
provided the working capital needed by enterprises and cash used principally to cover labor costs 
and purchases of agricultural products.  The role of the banking system was limited, since most 
investments in fixed assets in enterprises were financed by direct transfers or grants from the 
government budget. In 1983, in a major reform, direct grants were replaced with interest-bearing 
loans to production enterprises.  Consequently, the banking system gradually became the primary 
channel through which investments were financed and the central authority exercised 
macroeconomic control.  In 1984, the PBC was transformed into the Central Bank of China under 
the State Council and its commercial banking operations were transferred to the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China.  A network of provincial branches came to serve as the relays for the 
central bank's monetary operations.  At the same time, other specialized banks and non-bank 
financial institutions and numerous local branches also emerged. The banks and the central bank 
established municipal, county and sometimes township level branches. The pressure on the central 
bank to lend originated in investment demand from state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
  These developments have made possible a decentralization of enterprise financing, but they 
have also created a wider financial arena for the scramble after resources and have greatly 
complicated the management of monetary policy from the center.  Under the de-concentrated 
system, provincial and local authorities have substantial powers in investment decision-making and 
exert great influence on local bank branches' credit expansion.  Although provinces are given certain 
credit ceilings at the beginning of the year, the central bank is often forced to revise the annual credit 
plans under pressure from localities. Local branches of the central bank were given discretionary 
authority over 30 percent of the central bank’s annual lending to the financial sector (see Word 
Bank, 1997:7.23). Provincial and local governments used this discretionary authority of central bank 
branches to their advantage by borrowing at will thereby endangering price stability.   According to 
Qian and Wu (2000), 70% of the central bank loans to state banks were channeled through central 
bank regional branches. Consequently, two-digit inflation occurred in 1988 and 1989 and was 
followed by a credit squeeze. Monetary (inflation) cycles appeared to be more frequent than during 
the pre-reform era and caused significant resource waste. As 1992's credit ceilings were again 
exceeded by a surprisingly high margin, for instance two-digit inflation reoccurred in 1993, 1994, 
and 1995. Given these effects some studies have identified monetary de-concentration during this 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 See Banco do Brasil 2000, and 2002.   10
period as a mistake (Qian, 2000).
3 As a response the “Central Bank Law” of 1995 re-centralized 
monetary policy by reassigning supervisory power of central bank regional braches uniquely to 
Central Bank Headquarters. The Chinese monetary authorities have taken steps to promote arms 
length transactions in the banking system albeit with limited success. This was done by promoting 
arms length transactions in the government owned banking sector through (a) reducing provincial 
government influence on the PBC’s regional branches. The PBC was reorganized into 9 regions as 
opposed to earlier configuration of 31 provincial jurisdictions; (b) limiting sub-national influences 
on state-owned bank, which was met with little success as the SOE’s borrowing from these banks 
could not be restrained and non-performing portfolio of these bank grew in size; and (c)  interest rate 
liberalization to bring market discipline. 
  These above policies have not been very successful.  This is because while state commercial 
banks are not under the control of local governments and have the authority to decide how to 
allocate their loans, yet state banks receive strong pressures from the central government either to 
directly fund SOEs that could not cover wage payments (Cull and Xu, 2003) or to purchase bonds 
issued by policy banks (Yusuf, 1997). State banks are willing to comply with these demands on the 
expectation of central government bailout in case of default. In this vein, Cull and Xu (2003) present 
empirical evidence that the link between bank loans and profitability weakened in the 1990s, while 
Shirai (2001) finds empirically that commercial bank investments in government bonds are 
associated with lower levels of profitability. Results from both of the aforementioned studies 
buttress the notion that Chinese reforms have not been successful in promoting arms-length 
transactions in the banking system, which is riddled with lending operations of a bailout-type nature.  
The central government’s use of the banking system to finance sub-national governments and SOEs  




2.2 Institutional Setting for Fiscal Policy  
 
  In a unitary country, the central government assumes exclusive responsibility for fiscal 
policy. In federal countries, fiscal policy becomes a responsibility shared by all levels of 
government and the federal government in these countries uses its spending power i.e. powers of 
                                                      
3 According to Ma (1995), due to current monetary and fiscal institutions local government incentives are 
not aligned with those of the central level, significant decentralization reforms in 1989, and 1993 were 
immediately followed by inflation forcing the central government back to centralization.   11
the purse (fiscal transfers) and moral suasion through joint meetings to induce a coordinated 
approach to fiscal policy. The allocation of responsibilities under a federal system also pays some 
attention to the conduct of stabilization policies. This is often done by assigning stable and 
cyclically less sensitive revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities to sub-national 
governments. Such an assignment attempts to insulate local governments from economic cycles 
and the national government assumes prominence in the conduct of a stabilization policy.  In 
large federal countries such insulation is usually possible only for the lowest tier of government 
as the intermediate tier (states and provinces) shares responsibilities with the federal government 
in providing cyclically sensitive services such as social assistance. These intermediate tier 
governments are allowed access to cyclically sensitive revenue bases that act as built-in 
(automatic) stabilizers.  
 
Fiscal Federalism as a Bane for Fiscal Prudence 
 
Several writers (Tanzi, 1996, Wonnacott, 1972) have argued, without empirical 
corroboration, that the financing of sub-national governments is likely to be a source of concern 
within open federal systems since sub-national governments may circumvent federal fiscal policy 
objectives. Tanzi (1995) is also concerned with deficit creation and debt management policies of 
junior governments. A number of recent studies highlight institutional weaknesses in federal 
constitutions that may work against coordination of fiscal policies in a federal economy 
(Weingast 1995, Seabright 1996, Saiegh and Tommasi 2000, Iaryczower at al.  2001). These 
studies note that the institutional framework defining a federal governance structure is usually 
composed of a body of incomplete contracts.
4  In the presence of undefined or vague property 
rights over taxing and spending jurisdictions among layers of government, suboptimal policies 
would emerge as these would represent the outcome of the intergovernmental bargaining process 
as opposed to evolution from sound economic principles. They argue that the federal bargaining 
process is subject to the common property resource problem as well as the “norm of 
universalism” or “pork barrel politics”; both of which lead to over-grazing.. For example, Jones, 
Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1998) assert that the problem of universalism manifests in Argentina at 
                                                      
4 Incompleteness of these contracts arises as unforeseen issues come to the policy agenda. Several of these 
issues could not possibly contemplated at the original contract –constitution− or if covered, not fully 
addressed on it due to the ever increasing complexity in public management over time, or due to the 
prohibitely high costs that designing policy for a immensely large number of future possible scenarios 
would entail.   12
two levels - first, among provinces lobbying for federal resources, and second, among local 
governments for greater stakes of the each provincial pool of resources.  
 
Fiscal Federalism as a Boon to Fiscal Prudence 
 
Available theoretical and empirical work does not provide support for the validity of 
these concerns.  On the first point, at the theoretical level, Sheikh and Winer (1977) demonstrate 
that relatively extreme and unrealistic assumptions about discretionary non-cooperation by junior 
jurisdictions are needed to conclude that stabilization by the central authorities would not work at 
all simply because of a lack of cooperation.  These untenable assumptions include regionally 
symmetric shocks, a closed economy, segmented capital markets, lack of supply side-effects of 
local fiscal policy, non-availability of built-in stabilizers in the tax-transfer systems of sub-
national governments and in interregional trade, constraints on the use of federal spending power 
(such as conditional grants intended to influence subnational behavior), unconstrained and 
undisciplined local borrowing and extremely non-cooperative collusive behavior by subnational 
governments (see also Gramlich, 1987, Mundell, 1963, Spahn, 1997). The empirical simulations 
of Sheikh and Winer for Canada further suggest that failure of federal fiscal policy in most 
instances cannot be attributed to non-cooperative behavior by junior governments.   Saknini, 
James and Sheikh (1996) further demonstrate that, in a decentralized federation having markedly 
differentiated sub-national economies with incomplete markets and non-traded goods, federal 
fiscal policy acts as insurance against region-specific risks and therefore decentralized fiscal 
structures do not compromise any of the goals sought under a centralized fiscal policy (see also 
CEPR, 1993).  
  Gramlich (1987) points out that in open economies, exposure to international competition 
would benefit some regions at the expense of others. The resulting asymmetric shocks, he argues, 
can be more effectively dealt with by regional stabilization policies in view of the better 
information and instruments that are available at the regional/local levels. An example supporting 
Gramlich’s view would be the effect of oil price shocks on oil producing regions. For example, 
the Province of Alberta in Canada dealt with such a shock effectively by siphoning off 30 percent 
of oil revenues received during boom years to the Alberta Heritage Trust Fund, a “rainy day 
umbrella” or a stabilization fund. This fund was later used for stabilization purposes i.e. it was 
run down when the price of oil fell. The Colombia Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund follows the 
same tradition.    13
  The above conclusion however, must be qualified by the fact that errant fiscal behavior 
by powerful members of a federation can have an important constraining influence on the conduct 
of federal macro policies.  For example, achievement of the Bank of Canada’s goal of price 
stability was made more difficult by the inflationary pressures arising from the Province of 
Ontario’s increases in social spending during the boom years of late 1980’s. Such difficulties 
stress the need for fiscal policy coordination under a decentralized federal system.  
  On the potential for fiscal mismanagement with decentralization as noted above by Tanzi, 
empirical evidence from a number of countries suggests that, while national/central/federal fiscal 
policies typically do not adhere to the European Union (EU) guidelines that deficits should not 
exceed 3% of GDP and debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, junior government policies 
typically do. This is true both in decentralized federal countries such as Brazil and Canada and 
centralized federal countries such as Australia and India.  Centralized unitary countries do even 
worse on the basis of these indicators. For example, Greece, Turkey and Portugal and a large 
number of developing countries, do not satisfy the EU guidelines. National governments also 
typically do not adhere to EU requirements that the central banks should not act as a lender of last 
resort.   
The failure of collective action in forcing fiscal discipline at the national level arises from 
the “tragedy of commons” or “norm of universalism” or “pork barrel politics”. But these 
problems are not unique to federal system.   Legislators, in both federal and unitary countries, in 
their attempt to avoid a deadlock trade votes and support each others projects by implicitly 
agreeing that “I’ll favor your best project if you favor mine” (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1992: 13). 
Such a behavior leads to overspending and higher debt overhang at the national level. It also leads 
to regionally differentiated bases for federal corporate income taxation and thereby loss of federal 
revenues through these tax expenditures. Such tax expenditures accentuate fiscal deficits at the 
national level. In the first 140 years of US history, the negative impact of “universalism” was kept 
to a minimum by two fiscal rules: the Constitution formally constrained federal spending power 
to narrowly defined areas and an informal rule was followed to the effect that the federal 
government could only borrow to fight recession or wars (Niskanen, 1992). The Great Depression 
and the New Deal led to an abandonment of these fiscal rules. Inman and Fitts (1990) provide 
empirical evidence supporting the working of “universalism” in post New Deal, USA. To 
overcome difficulties noted above with national fiscal policy, solutions proposed include: “gate-
keeper” committees (Weingast and Marshall, 1988, Eichengreen, Hausman and von Hagen, 
1997); imposing party discipline within legislatures (Cremer, 1986); constitutionally imposed or 
legislated fiscal rules (Niskanen, 1992, Poterba and von Hagen, 1999; Braun and Tommasi, 2001;   14
Kennedy and Robins, 2001; Kopits, 2005); executive agenda setting (Ingberman and Yao, 1991); 
market discipline (Lane, 1993); and decentralizing when potential inefficiencies of national 
government democratic choice outweigh economic gains with centralization. Observing a similar 
situation in Latin American countries prompted Eichengreen, Hausman and von Hagen (1997) to 
propose establishment of an independent “gate-keeper” in the form of a national fiscal council to 
periodically set maximum allowable increases in general government debt. While federal and 
unitary countries alike face these problems, yet federal countries have demonstrated greater 
adaptation in limiting the discretionary and unwelcome outcomes of political markets by trying 
on the solutions proposed above.  It is also interesting to note that fiscal stabilization failed under 
a centralized structure in Brazil but achieved major successes in this arena later under a 
decentralized fiscal system.  The results in Table 5 provide further confirmation of these 
observations. The table using regression analysis shows that debt management discipline (country 
ratings by the World Bank staff) had a positive but insignificant association with the degree of 
fiscal decentralization for a sample of 24 countries. 
  Given that the potential exists for errant fiscal behavior of national and sub-national 
governments to complicate the conduct of fiscal policy, what institutional arrangements are 
necessary to safeguard against such an eventuality. As discussed below, mature federations place 
a great deal of emphasis on intergovernmental coordination through executive or legislative 
federalism as well as fiscal rules to achieve a synergy among policies at different levels. In 
unitary countries, on the other hand, the emphasis traditionally has been on use of centralization 
or direct central controls. These controls typically have failed to achieve a coordinated response 
due to intergovernmental gaming. Moreover, the national government completely escapes any 
scrutiny except when it seeks international help from external sources such as the IMF. But 
external help creates a moral hazard problem in that it creates bureaucratic incentives on both 
sides to ensure that such assistance is always in demand and utilized.  
 
 
Fiscal Policy Coordination in Mature Federations 
 
  In mature federations, fiscal policy coordination is exercised both through executive and 
legislative federalism as well as formal and informal fiscal rules.  In recent years, legislated fiscal 
rules have come to command greater attention in both federal and unitary countries alike ( see 
Table 6). These rules take the form of budgetary balance controls, debt restrictions, tax or 
expenditure controls and referendum for new taxing and spending initiatives. For example, the   15
European Union in its goal of creating a monetary union through the provisions of the Maastricht 
treaty established ceilings on national deficits and debts and supporting provisions that there 
should be no bailout of any government by member central banks or by the European Central 
Bank. The European Union is also prohibited from providing an unconditional guarantee in 
respect of the public debt of a member state (Pisani-Ferry, 1991). These provisions were 
subsequently strengthened by the Growth and Stability Pact provisions (legislated fiscal rules 
adopted by the European Parliament). Most mature federations also specify no bailout provisions 
in setting up central banks with the notable exception of Australia until 1992 and Brazil until 
1996. In the presence of an explicit or even implicit bailout guarantee and preferential loans from 
the banking sector, printing of money by sub-national governments is possible thereby fueling 
inflation. European Union guidelines provide a useful framework for macro coordination in 
federal systems but such guidelines may not ensure macro stability as the guidelines may restrain 
smaller countries with little influence on macro stability such as Greece but may not restrain 
superpowers like France and Germany as demonstrated by recent history. Thus a proper 
enforcement of guidelines may require a fiscal coordinating council. Recent experiences with 
fiscal adjustment programs suggest that while legislated fiscal rules are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for successful fiscal adjustment, they can be of help in forging sustained political 
commitment to achieve better fiscal outcomes especially in countries with divisive political 
institutions or coalition regimes. For example, such rules can be helpful in sustaining political 
commitment to reform in countries with proportional representation (Brazil) or multi-party 
coalition governments (India) or in countries with separation of legislative and executive 
functions (USA, Brazil). Fiscal rules in such countries can help restrain pork-barrel politics and 
thereby improve fiscal discipline.  Von Hagen (2005) based upon a review of EU experiences 
with fiscal rules concludes that budgetary institutions matter more than fiscal rules. The EU fiscal 
rules may have encouraged European countries to strengthen budgetary institutions which in turn 
had welcome effects on fiscal discipline and fiscal outcomes.    



















EU- GSP  yes  yes      Yes but 
ineffective 
for large 
states   16
US States  48  41  30  3  yes 
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8 3 2  4  yes 
Germany Yes         
New Zealand  Yes         
Sweden     yes     
Switzerland yes  yes  yes  yes   
Brazil, 2000-  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
including 
prison terms 
Argentina, 2004-  Yes  Yes  yes     
Argentina -
provinces 
17 17 17     
India, 2003-  yes  Yes       
India - States  yes  yes       
Sources: Various including Finance Canada (2005). 
 
  Mature federations vary a great deal in terms of fiscal policy coordinating mechanisms. 
In the USA, there is no overall federal-state coordination of fiscal policy and there are no 
constitutional restraints on state borrowing but states’ own constitutional provisions prohibit 
operating deficits. Intergovernmental coordination often comes through establishment of fiscal 
rules established through acts of Congress such as the Gramm-Rudman Act. Fiscal discipline 
primarily arises from three distinct incentives offered by the political and market cultures. First, 
the electorates are conservative and elect candidates with a commitment to keep public spending 
in check. Second, pursuit of fiscal policies that are perceived as imprudent lower property values 
thereby lowering public revenues. Third, capital markets discipline governments that live beyond 
their means (see Inman and Rubinfeld, 1992).    
  In Canada, there are elaborate mechanisms for federal-provincial fiscal coordination. 
These take the form of intergovernmental conferences (periodic first ministers’ and finance 
ministers/treasurers’ conferences) and the Council of the Federation (an interprovincial 
consultative body). The majority of direct program expenditures in Canada are at the sub-national 
level but Ottawa (i.e. the Canadian federal government) retains flexibility and achieves fiscal 
harmonization through conditional transfers and tax collection agreements.  In addition, Ottawa 
has established a well- knit system of institutional arrangements for intergovernmental 
consultation and coordination. But much of the discipline on public sector borrowing comes from 
the private banking sector monitoring deficits and debt at all levels of government. Overall 
financial markets and electorates impose a strong fiscal discipline at the sub-national level.  
  In Switzerland, societal conservatism, fiscal rules and intergovernmental relations play an 
important part in fiscal coordination. Borrowing by cantons and communes is restricted to capital   17
projects that can be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis and requires popular referenda for 
approval. In addition, cantons and communes must balance current budgets including interest 
payments and debt amortization. Intergovernmental coordination is also fostered by “common 
budget directives” applicable to all levels of government. These embody the following general 
principles: (a) the growth rates of public expenditures should not exceed the expected growth of 
nominal GNP; (b) the budget deficit should not be higher than that of the previous year; (3) the 
number of civil servants should stay the same or increase only very slightly; (4) the volume of 
public sector building should remain constant and an inflation indexation clause should be 
avoided (Gygi, 1991:10). 
  The German Constitution specifies that Bund (federal) and Laender (state level 
governments) have budgetary independence (Art. 109(1) GG) but must take into account the 
requirements of overall economic equilibrium (Art. 109 (2) GG). The 1969 Law of Stability and 
Growth established the Financial Planning Council and the Cyclical Planning Council as 
coordinating bodies for the two levels of government. It stipulates uniform budgetary principles 
to facilitate coordination. Annual budgets are required to be consistent with the medium term 
financial plans. The Law further empowered the federal government to vary tax rates and 
expenditures on short notice and even to restrict borrowing and equalization transfers. Lander 
parliaments no longer have tax legislation authority and Bund and Laender borrowing is restricted 
by the German constitution to projected outlays for capital projects (the so-called “golden rule”). 
However, federal borrowing to correct “disturbances of general economic equilibrium” is exempt 
from the application of this rule. The federal government also follows a five year budget plan to 
so that its fiscal policy stance is available to sub-national governments.  Two major instruments 
were created by the 1969 law to forge cooperative federalism: (i) joint tasks authorized by the 
Bundesrat and (ii) federal grants for state and local spending mandated by federal legislation or 
federal-state agreements. An additional helpful matter in intergovernmental coordination is that 
the central bank (Bundesbank) is independent of all levels of government and focuses on price 
stability as its objective. Most important, full and effective federal-lander fiscal coordination is 
achieved through the Bundesrat, the upper house of parliament where lander governments are 
directly represented. German Bundesrat represents the most outstanding institution for formal 
intergovernmental coordination. Such formal institutions for intergovernmental coordination are 
useful especially in countries with legislative federalism. The Constitution Act, 1996 of the 
Republic of South Africa has established such an institution for intergovernmental coordination 
called the National Council of the Provinces.     18
  Commonwealth-state fiscal coordination in Australia offers important lessons for federal 
countries. Australia established a loan council in 1927 as an instrument of credit allocation since 
it restricted state governments to borrow only from the commonwealth. An important exception 
to this rule was that states could however use borrowing by autonomous agencies and local 
government for own purposes. This exception proved to be the Achilles’ heel for the 
Commonwealth Loan Council, as states used this exception extensively in their attempt to by-
pass the cumbersome procedures and control over their capital spending plans by the Council. 
The Commonwealth Government ultimately recognized in 1993 that central credit allocation 
policy was a flawed and ineffective instrument. It lifted restrictions on state borrowing and 
reconstituted the Loan Council so that it could serve as a coordinating agency for information 
exchange so as to ensure greater market accountability. The New Australian Loan Council 
attempts to provide a greater flexibility to states to determine their own borrowing requirements 
and attempts to coordinate borrowing with fiscal needs and overall macro strategy (see Figure 2). 
It further instills a greater understanding of the budgetary process and provides timely and 
valuable information to the financial markets on public sector borrowing plans. The process 
seems to be working well so far. 
  For the European Union, Wierts (2005) concludes that sub-national governments’ 
contributions to consolidated public sector deficits and debts were relatively smaller as compared 
to the central governments in most EU countries – federal and unitary countries alike..   
 
The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Fiscal Management – Econometric Evidence 
  
Econometric analysis carried out here and presented in Tables  7 through 14 examine the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on various dimensions of the quality of fiscal management   
Econometric evidence presented here supports the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization has a 
positive significant impact on the quality of fiscal management (Table 7). The effect of fiscal 
decentralization on the efficiency in revenue collection is negative but insignificant (Table 8). 
Fiscal decentralization leads to prudent use of public resources (Table 9). Growth in public 
spending is positively associated with fiscal decentralization but insignificantly so with the score 
index of decentralization (Table 10). Fiscal decentralization is negatively but insignificantly 
associated with the control of deficits (Table 11). Fiscal decentralization has a positive but 
insignificant impact on growth of public debt (Table 12).  Fiscal decentralization contributes to 
enhanced transparency and accountability in public management (Table 13).  Finally, fiscal 
decentralization has a positive yet insignificant association with growth of GDP.   19
    
Fiscal Policy Coordination in Brazil: From Fiscal Distress to Fiscal Discipline – A Giant Leap 
Forward 
 
  Tax assignments mandated by the 1988 Constitution in Brazil reduced federal flexibility in 
the conduct of fiscal policies.  The new Constitution transferred some productive federal taxes to 
lower level jurisdictions and also increased sub-national governments' participation in federal 
revenue sharing schemes. One of the most productive taxes, the value added tax on sales, was 
assigned to states and the Council of State Finance Ministers (CONFAZ) was set up to play a 
coordinating role.  Federal flexibility in the income tax area, however, remained intact. This gives 
the federal government some possibility of not only affecting aggregate disposable income, and 
therefore aggregate demand, but also exerting direct influence over the revenues and fiscal behavior 
of the lower levels of government which end up receiving nearly half of the proceeds of this tax.  
The effectiveness of such a policy tool is an open question and critically depends upon the goodwill 
of sub-national governments.  Consider the case where the federal government decides to implement 
a discretionary income tax cut.  The measure could have a potentially significant effect on the 
revenues of state and local governments, given their large share in the proceedings of this tax.  It is 
possible that, in order to offset this substantial loss in revenues from federal sources, lower levels of 
government might choose either to increase the rates and/or bases on the taxes under their 
jurisdiction, or increase their tax effort.  Such state and local government responses could potentially 
undermine the effectiveness of income taxes as a fiscal policy instrument.  Thus a greater degree of 
intergovernmental consultation, cooperation and coordination would be needed for the success of 
stabilization policies. 
  An overall impact of the new fiscal arrangements was to limit federal control over public 
sector expenditures in the federation. The success of federal expenditures as a stabilization tool 
again depends upon sub-national government cooperation in harmonizing their expenditure policies 
with the federal government.  Once again, the Constitution has put a premium on intergovernmental 
coordination of fiscal policies.  Such a degree of coordination may not be attainable in times of 
fiscal distress. 
  A reduction in revenues at the federal government's disposal and an incomplete transfer of 
expenditure responsibilities have further constrained the federal government.  The primary source of 
federal revenues are income taxes.  These taxes are easier to avoid and evade by taxpayers and 
therefore are declining in relative importance as a source of revenues.  Value added sales taxes, 
which are considered a more dynamic source of revenues, have been assigned to the state level.    20
Thus federal authorities lack access to more productive tax bases to alleviate the public debt 
problem and to gain more flexibility in the implementation of fiscally based macroeconomic 
stabilization policies. According to Shah (1991, 1998) and Bomfim and Shah (1994) this situation 
could be remedied if a joint federal-state VAT to be administered by a federal-state council were to 
be instituted as a replacement for the federal IPI, the state ICMS, and the municipal services tax, 
which bases partially overlap.  Such a joint tax would help alleviate the current federal fiscal crisis 
as well as streamline sales tax administration. They argued that Federal expenditure requirements 
could be curtailed with federal disengagement from purely local functions and by eliminating 
federal tax transfers to municipalities.  Transfers to the municipalities would be better administered 
at the state level as states have better access to data on municipal fiscal capacities and tax effort in 
their jurisdictions.  Some rethinking is in order on the role of negotiated transfers that have 
traditionally served to advance pork-barrel politics rather than to address national objectives.  If 
these transfers were replaced by performance oriented conditional block (per capita) federal 
transfers to achieve national (minimum) standards, both the accountability and coordination in the 
federation would be enhanced. These rearrangements would provide the federal government with 
greater flexibility to pursuit its macroeconomic policy objectives. Finally, they advocated the 
development of fiscal rules binding on all levels of government and a federal-state coordinating 
council to ensure that these rules are enforced.    
There has been significant progress on most of  these issues in recent years. For example, 
negotiated transfers have become insignificant due to the fiscal squeeze experienced by the federal 
government. The senate has prescribed guidelines (Senate Resolution #69, 1995) for state debt: 
maximum debt service is not to exceed 16% of net revenue or 100% of current revenue surplus, 
whichever is less and the maximum growth in stock of debt (new borrowing) within a 12 month 
period, must not exceed the level of existing debt service or 27% of net revenues whichever is 
greater (Dillinger, 1997). More recently in 1998, pension and civil service entitlements reform have 
introduced greater budgetary flexibility for all levels of government. Likewise, after the suboptimal 
results achieved from letting capital markets discipline sub-national borrowings, the Brazilian 
federal government opted for establishing a fairly constraining set of Fiscal Responsibility 
institutions. First, the Law 9696 of September 1997 set up the framework for a series of debt 
restructuring contracts between December 1997 and June 1998, whereby a portion of debt (20 
percent) should be paid with the proceedings of privatization of state assets, while the remaining 
portion of state and local debt was restructured with maturities up to 30 years at a subsidized 
interest rate (equal to 6 percent annual real rate). Debt restructuring contracts become 
comprehensive in scope as twenty five out of 27 states and over 180 municipalities signed debt   21
restructuring agreements (Goldfajn and Refinetti 2003, IMF 2001). In exchange the contracts 
require the SNGS’ commitments to engage in adjustment programs aimed to reduce the debt to 
net revenue ratio to less than one over a per-case negotiated period of time. Contracts established 
sanctions for violations to adjustment program agreements, such as increase debt service caps 
(annual debt service to net revenue ratio of 13 to 15 percent above which service debt is 
capitalized) and substitutions of market interest rate for the subsidized interest rate.  Debt re-
structuring contracts also impose stringent penalties for non-compliant states and in the event of a 
default, authorize the federal government to withhold fiscal transfers or, if this is not enough, to 
withdraw the amount due to the states from their bank accounts (Goldfajn and Refinetti, 2003, p. 
18). Debt restructuring agreements prohibit further credit or re-structuring operations involving 
other levels of government. This helps to avoid moral hazard incentives from the possibility of 
intergovernmental bailouts (IMF, 2001). 
Building upon the Law 6996/97 and complementary regulations the Brazilian federal 
government adopted a Fiscal Responsibility Law (Lei de Responsibilidade Fiscal -LRF) in May 
2000 and its companion Law (Lei 10028/2000) binding for federal, state and municipal/local 
governments. The LRF is likely the most significant reform after 1988 constitution in terms of its 
impact on the dynamics of federalism in Brazil; as subsequent compromises between states and 
the federal government have continuously increased the negotiation leverage of the latter 
increasing also its effectiveness in macroeconomic management. The FRL establishes ex-ante 
institutions such as a threshold state debt, deficit, and personnel spending ceilings. According to 
the LRF states and municipalities must maintain debt stock levels below ceilings determined by 
the Federal Senate regulations. If a sub-national government exceeds this debt ceiling the 
exceeding amount must be reduced within one-year period, during which the state or municipality 
is prohibited of incurring any new debt and becomes ineligible for receiving discretionary 
transfers (World Bank 2002). The LRF also regulates that all new borrowing requires the 
technical approval of the Central Bank and the approval of the Senate. Borrowing operations are 
prohibited all together during a period of 180-days before the end of incumbents’ government 
mandate (Afonso and de Mello, 2000). In terms of personnel management, the LRF provisions 
define ceilings on payroll spending. This should not exceed 50 percent of federal government’s 
net revenues while this ceiling equals 60 percent at the sub-national level.  The LRF also 
institutionalized a variety of ex-post provisions aimed at the enforcement of its regulations. For 
governments, violations to personnel or debt ceiling can lead to fines up to 30% of annual salary 
of the responsible; impeachment of mayors or governors; and even prison terms in case of 
violation of mandates regarding election years. For capital markets, the LRF declares that   22
financing operations in violation of debt ceilings would not be legally valid and amounts 
borrowed should be repaid fully without interest. This provision is aimed at discouraging such 
lending behavior by the financial institutions.   
The Brazilian Federation had a remarkable success in ensuring fiscal policy coordination 
and fiscal discipline at all levels in recent years. By June 2005, the LRF (2000) had significant 
positive impacts on fiscal performance in Brazil. All states and the federal government have 
complied with the ceiling on personnel expenditures (50% of current revenues). On debt, only 5 
states out of 27 states (inclusive of Federal District) are still above the ceiling of 200% of 
revenues, owing to 2002 currency devaluation. 92% of municipalities have reduced debts below 
1.2 times revenue levels and only a handful of large municipalities have unsustainable debt levels. 
Primary surplus was achieved by all states by 2004 (Levy, 2005).   
 
Fiscal Management in China: An Unmet Challenge 
 
  Before 1980, China's fiscal system was characterized by a decentralized revenue collection 
followed by central transfers i.e., all taxes and profits were remitted to the central government and 
then transferred back to the provinces according to expenditure needs approved by the center 
through bilateral negotiations.  Under this system, the localities had little managerial autonomy in 
local economic development.  In 1980, this system was changed into a contracting  system.  Under 
the new arrangements, each level of government makes a contract with the next level up to meet 
certain revenue and expenditure targets.  A typical contract defines a method of revenue-sharing, 
which could be a percentage share that goes to the center, or a fixed fee plus a percentage share.  
This contracting system means that the economic interests of each level of government are sharply 
identified. 
  Under the fiscal contract system introduced in the early 1980s, the localities have controlled 
the effective tax rates and tax bases in the following two ways.  First, they have controlled tax 
collection efforts by offering varying degrees of tax concessions.  Second, they have found ways to 
convert budgetary funds into extra-budgetary funds, thus avoiding tax-sharing with the center.  As a 
result, the center has had to resort to various ad hoc instruments to influence revenue remittance 
from the localities, and these instruments have led to perverse reactions from the localities.  On the 
expenditure side, the center has failed to achieve corresponding reductions in expenditure when 
revenue collection has been decentralized.  The center's flexibility in using expenditure policy has 
been seriously undermined by the lack of centrally-controlled financial resources and the heavy 
burden of "capital constructions."   Between 1978 and 1992, the ratio of government revenue to   23
GNP dropped from 31 percent to 17 percent.  Increasing deficits became a problem, and the lack of 
funds for infrastructure investment exacerbated bottlenecks in the economy.   
  Due to the lack of fiscal resources and policy instruments, the central government has found 
itself in an increasingly difficult position to achieve the goals of macroeconomic stabilization, 
regional equalization, and public goods provision.  In early 1994, the central government initiated 
reform of the tax assignment system in an attempt to address these difficulties.  Under the new 
system, the center will recentralize the administration and collection of central and shared-taxes and 
will obtain a larger share of fiscal resources as a result of the new revenue-sharing formula. Initially, 
among the major taxes only the VAT was centralized. Later in year 2002, the administration of 
Personal Income Tax and the Enterprise Income Tax was also centralized.  The VAT is shared 75:25 
(centre-local) and all extra central revenues above the 1993 levels is then shared 60:40. Revenues 
are returned to provinces using derivation or point of collection basis.  The central government 
expected to improve significantly its ability to use tax and expenditure policies in macroeconomic 
management as a result of these steps.  Nevertheless, the new system fails to address a number of 
flaws in the old system : (1) the division of tax bases according to ownership will continue to 
motivate the center to reclaim enterprise ownership whenever necessary; (2) the division of 
expenditure responsibility is not yet clearly defined; (3) the new system impedes local autonomy as 
the localities are not allowed to determine the bases and/or rates for local taxes; and (4) the design of 
intergovernmental transfers is not fully settled yet. In 1994 and 1995, the central government also 
imposed administrative restrictions on investments by provincial and local governments and their 
enterprises (see Ma, 1995, and World Bank, 1994  for further details) to deal with inflationary 
pressures.  The introduction of the State Council Document No.29 in 1996 and other measures in 
1997 to consolidate budgetary management over extra-budgetary funds, sharply restricted the 
authority of local governments especially rural local governments to impose fees and levies to 
finance own expenditures  (see World Bank, 1998).  
The Budget Law 1994 prohibits the central government from borrowing from the Peoples 
Central Bank of China. The Budget Law also requires local governments to have balanced 
budgets and restricts sub-national governments borrowing in financial markets and issuing bonds 
(Qian 2000).  Legal restraints on sub-national borrowing and unfunded central mandates have 
encouraged provincial-local governments to assume hidden debts. Such borrowing is channeled 
through state-owned entities such as urban construction and investment companies that borrow 
from banks or issue bonds on behalf of the local government (World Bank, 2005). Such hidden 
debts pose significant risks for macro stability.   24
A combination of unfunded mandates and extremely constrained taxing powers generate 
incentives for local governments to develop informal channels of taxation. This is evidenced by 
the high levels of extra budgetary funds (self raised funds) at the sub-provincial levels, 
comprising surcharges, fees, utility and user charges that are not formally approved by the central 
government while technically legal. A pilot experiment in Anhui province identified collection of 
per capita fees from peasants for local education, health, militia training, road construction and 
maintenance, welfare for veterans, and birth control (Yep, 2004).  This type of quasi-fiscal 
income, which accounted for as high as 56% of total tax revenues in 1996 (Eckaus 2003: China 
Statistical Yearbook 2000, pp. 257, 271)  or 8-10 per cent of GDP in 1995 (World Bank, 2000). 
This non-tax type of revenue extraction has often imposed excessive burdens in local constituents 
generating continuous confrontations between peasants and local officials (Lin and others 2002, 
Bernstein and Lu 2003, Yep 2004).  As noted by Krug, Zhu, and Hendrischke (2005) sub-
provincial governments agencies de facto control of the property rights of revenues not covered 
by the tax sharing system enables “sub-provincial governments at all levels to maintain their 
residual tax rights over the informal tax system.” (p.11). In fact, institutions ruling sub-provincial 
taxation are shaped as a complex and asymmetric system of contracts between the provincial 
government and lower layers of government. More recently the central government has abolished 
the agricultural income tax and rural fees and charges in 2002 through the “Tax-for-Fee 
program”. These prohibitions have deleterious consequences for county finances as compensating 
transfers do not fully cover these growing sources of county finance.  
Promoting greater fiscal discipline at the sub-national level in China remains virtually an 
impossible task so long as local governments retain ownership of enterprises providing private 
goods, lack clarity in their spending and taxing responsibilities and obtain a disproportionate 
amount of local revenues from ad hoc central transfers. Thus fiscal policy coordination and fiscal 
discipline remains an unfinished challenge in China. 
 
Fiscal Policy Coordination - Some Conclusions 
 
  Fiscal policy coordination represents an important challenge for federal systems. In this 
context, fiscal rules and institutions provide a useful framework but not necessary a solution to 
this challenge. Fiscal rules binding on all levels can help sustain political commitment in 
countries having coalitions or fragmented regimes in power. Coordinating institutions help in the 
use of moral suasion to encourage a coordinated response.   Industrialized countries experiences 
also show that unilaterally imposed federal controls and constraints on sub-national governments   25
typically do not work. Instead, societal norms based on fiscal conservatism such as the Swiss 
referenda and political activism of the electorate play important roles. Ultimately capital markets 
and bond-rating agencies provide more effective discipline on fiscal policy. In this context, it is 
important not to backstop state and local debt and not to allow ownership of the banks by any 
level of government. Transparency of the budgetary process and institutions, accountability to the 
electorate and general availability of comparative data encourages fiscal discipline.    
 
3.  Securing an Economic Union 
 
  Five dimensions of securing an economic union in a federal system have relevance for 
macroeconomic governance: preservation of the internal common market; tax harmonization; 
transfers and social insurance; intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and regional fiscal equity. 
These are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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3.1  Preservation of the Internal Common Market 
 
  Preservation of an internal common market remains an important area of concern to most 
nations undertaking decentralization.  Sub-national governments in their pursuit of attracting 
labor and capital may indulge in beggar-thy-neighbor policies and in the process erect barriers to 
goods and factor mobility. Thus decentralization of government regulatory functions creates a 
potential for disharmonious economic relations among sub-national units. Accordingly, 
regulation of economic activity such as trade and investment is generally best left to the 
federal/central government. It should be noted, however, that central governments themselves 
may pursue policies detrimental to the internal common market. Therefore, as suggested by 
Boadway (1992), constitutional guarantees for free domestic flow of goods and services may be 
the best alternative to assigning regulatory responsibilities solely to the center.  
  The Constitutions of mature federations typically provide: a free trade clause (as in 
Australia, Canada and Switzerland); federal regulatory power over interstate commerce (as in 
Australia, Canada, Germany, USA, and Switzerland) and individual mobility rights (as in most 
federations).  In contrast, in China, a large unitary country, mobility rights of individuals are 
severely constrained by the operation of  “hukou” system of household registration which is used 
to determine eligibility for grain rations, employment, housing, education and health care 
benefits. 
 
3.2 Tax Harmonization and Coordination 
 
  Tax competition among jurisdictions can be beneficial by encouraging cost-effectiveness 
and fiscal accountability in state governments. It can also by itself lead to a certain amount of tax 
harmonization. At the same time, decentralized tax policies can cause certain inefficiencies and 
inequities in a federation as well as lead to excessive administrative costs. Tax harmonization is 
intended to preserve the best features of tax decentralization while avoiding its disadvantages. 
  Inefficiencies from decentralized decision making can occur in a variety of ways. For 
one, states may implement policies which discriminate in favor of their own residents and 
businesses relative to those of other states.  They may also engage in beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies intended to attract economic activity from other states. Inefficiency may also occur 
simply from the fact that distortions will arise from different tax structures chosen  independently 
by state governments with no strategic objective in mind. Inefficiencies also can occur if state tax 
systems adopt different conventions for dealing with businesses (and residents) who operate in   27
more than one jurisdiction at the same time.  This can lead to double taxation of some forms of 
income and non-taxation of others. State tax systems may also introduce inequities as mobility of 
persons would encourage them to abandon progressivity. Administration costs are also likely to 
be excessive in an uncoordinated tax system (see Boadway, Roberts and Shah, 1994). Thus tax 
harmonization and coordination contribute to efficiency of internal common market, reduce 
collection and compliance costs and help to achieve national standards of equity. 
  European Union has placed a strong emphasis on tax coordination issues. Canada has 
used tax collection agreements, tax abatement and tax base sharing to harmonize the tax system. 
The German federation emphasizes uniformity of tax bases by assigning the tax legislation to the 
federal government. In developing countries, due to tax centralization, tax coordination issues are 
relevant only for larger federations such as India and Brazil. In Brazil, the use of ICMS (origin 
based) as a tool for attracting capital inflow from other regions has become an area of emerging 
conflict among regions. Despite the fact that the Council of States sought to harmonize ICMS 
base and rates, there is evidence that some of the tax concessions refused by the Council are 
practiced by many states anyway.  States can also resort to tax base reductions or grant un-
indexed payment deferrals (Longo 1994). For example, some northeastern states have offered 
fifteen years ICMS tax deferral to industry. In an inflationary environment such a measure can 
serve as an important inducement for attracting capital from elsewhere in the country (Shah, 
1991).  
  Tax harmonization and coordination is theoretically a non-issue in the context of a 
unitary country but substantial use of informal tax system and tax preferences by local 
governments in China has elevated it to some prominence.  
 
3.3 Transfer Payments and Social Insurance 
 
  Along with the provision of public goods and services, transfer payments to persons and 
businesses comprise most of government expenditures (especially in industrialized countries). 
Some of these transfers are for redistributive purposes in the ordinary sense, and some are for 
industrial policy or regional development purposes. Some are also for redistribution in the social 
insurance sense, such as unemployment insurance, health insurance and public pensions. Several 
factors bear on the assignment of responsibility for transfers.  In the case of transfers to business, 
many economists would argue that they should not be used in the first place.  But, given that they 
are, they are likely to be more distortionary if used at the provincial level than at the federal level.  
This is because the objective of subsidies is typically to increase capital investments by firms,   28
which is mobile across provinces.  As for transfers to individuals, since most of them are for 
redistributive purposes, their assignment revolves around the extent to which the federal level of 
government assumes primary responsibility for equity. From an economic point of view, transfers 
are just negative direct taxes. One can argue that transfers should be controlled by the same level 
of government that controls direct taxes so that they can be integrated for equity purposes and 
harmonized across the nation for efficiency purposes. The case for integration at the central level 
is enhanced when one recognizes the several types of transfers that may exist to address different 
dimensions of equity or social insurance.  There is an advantage of coordinating unemployment 
insurance with the income tax system or pensions with payments to the poor. Decentralizing 
transfers to individuals to the provinces will likely lead to inefficiencies in the internal common 
market, fiscal inequities and inter-jurisdictional beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Following this 
guidance, most federal countries assign unemployment insurance and social security to national 
levels as do also most unitary countries. An important exception is China where these are 
considered provincial-local responsibilities.   
 
3.4 Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers  
 
  Federal-state transfers in a federal system serve important objectives: alleviating 
structural imbalances, correcting for fiscal inefficiencies and inequities, providing compensation 
for benefit spill-outs and achieving fiscal harmonization. The most important critical 
consideration is that the grant design must be consistent with grant objectives and ad hoc pork-
barrel transfers should be avoided. Industrial country experience shows that successful 
decentralization cannot be achieved in the absence of a well designed fiscal transfers program. 
The design of these transfers must be simple, transparent and consistent with their objectives. 
Properly structured transfers can enhance competition for the supply of public services, 
accountability of the fiscal system and fiscal coordination just as general revenue sharing has the 
potential to undermine it.  A comparative look at the design and practice of fiscal transfers 
suggest that federal countries typically pay greater attention to the incentive effects of these 
transfers than unitary countries.  
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3.5  Regional Fiscal Equity 
 
  While we have not addressed the regional equity issue due to paucity of data, a few 
casual observations may be in order. As we noted earlier, regional inequity is an area of concern 
for decentralized fiscal systems and most such systems attempt to deal with it through the 
spending powers of the national government or through fraternal programs. Mature federations 
such as Australia, Canada and Germany have formal equalization programs. This important 
feature of decentralization has not received adequate attention in the design of institutions in 
developing countries. Despite serious horizontal fiscal imbalances in a large number of 
developing countries, explicit equalization programs are untried, although equalization objectives 
are implicitly attempted in the general revenue sharing mechanisms used in Brazil, Colombia, 
India, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan. These mechanisms typically combine diverse and 
conflicting objectives into the same formula and fall significantly short on individual objectives. 
Because these formulas lack explicit equalization standards, they fail to address regional equity 
objectives satisfactorily.  
  Regional inequity concerns are more easily addressed by unitary countries but it is 
interesting to note that the record of unitary countries in addressing these inequities is worse than 
federal countries (Shankar and Shah, 2004). Von Hagen (2005) also concludes that  “surprisingly, 
perhaps, there is no clear evidence that regional risk sharing is larger in unitary than in federal 
states” (p.23).  
 
4.  Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Performance:  Some Conclusions 
 
Fiscal decentralization poses significant challenges for macroeconomic management. 
These challenges require careful design of monetary and fiscal institutions to overcome adverse 
incentives associated with the “common property” resource management problems or with rent 
seeking behaviors. Experiences of federal countries indicate significant learning and adaptation of 
fiscal systems to create incentives compatible with fair play and to overcome incomplete 
contracts.  This explains why that decentralized fiscal systems appear to do better than centralized 
fiscal systems on most aspects of monetary and fiscal policy management and transparent and 
accountable governance (see Table 15).      
 
 
   30
 
Table 15 Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Performance - A Summary of Empirical Results 
Fiscal Performance Indicator  Impact of Fiscal Decentralization 
Central Bank Independence  Positive and significant 
Growth of Money Supply  Positive but insignificant 
Inflation  Negative but insignificant 
Management of inflation and macroeconomic 
imbalances 
Positive but insignificant 
Quality of Debt Management  Positive but insignificant 
Quality of Fiscal Policies and Institutions  Positive and significant 
Efficiency in Revenue Collection  Mixed but insignificant 
Prudent Use of Tax Monies  Positive and significant 
Growth of government spending  Negative and significant 
Control of fiscal deficits  Negative but insignificant 
Growth of Public Debt  Positive yet insignificant 
Public Sector Management- Transparency and 
Accountability 
Positive and significant 
GDP growth  Positive but insignificant 
Source: Econometric results 
 
 
5.  Some Lessons for Developing Countries 
 
  The following important lessons for reform of fiscal systems in developing countries can 
be distilled from a review of past experiences. 
 
•  Monetary policy is best entrusted to an independent central bank with a sole mandate for 
price stability. Political feasibility of such an assignment improves under federal systems 
(decentralized fiscal systems).  
•  Fiscal rules are neither necessary nor sufficient for fiscal discipline. However, fiscal rules 
accompanied by “gate keeper” intergovernmental councils/committees provide a useful 
framework for fiscal discipline and fiscal policy coordination for countries with fragmented 
political regimes. In this context, one can draw upon industrial countries’ experiences with 
‘golden rules’, Maastricht type guidelines and ‘common budget directives’ to develop 
country specific guidelines. To ensure voluntary compliance with the guidelines, an 
appropriate institutional framework must be developed. Transparency of the budgetary 
processes and institutions, accountability to the electorate and general availability of 
comparative data on the fiscal positions of all levels of government further strengthen fiscal 
discipline.     31
•  The integrity and independence of the financial sector contributes to fiscal prudence in the 
public sector. To ensure such an integrity and independence, ownership and preferential 
access to the financial sector should not be available to any level of government. In such an 
environment capital markets and bond rating agencies would provide an effective fiscal 
policy discipline.     
•  To ensure fiscal discipline, governments at all levels must be made to face the financial 
consequences of their decisions. This is possible if the central government does not backstop 
state and local debt and the central bank does not act as a lender of last resort to the central 
government. 
•  Societal norms and consensus on the roles of various levels of governments and limits to their 
authorities are vital for the success of decentralized decision making.  In the absence of such 
norms and consensus, direct central controls do not work and intergovernmental gaming leads 
to dysfunctional constitutions. 
•  Tax decentralization is a pre-requisite for sub-national credit market access. In countries 
with highly centralized tax bases, unrestrained credit market access by sub-national 
governments poses a risk for macro stabilization policies of  the national government as the 
private sector anticipates a higher level government bailout in the event of default and does 
not discount the risks of such lending properly. 
•  Higher level institutional assistance may be needed for financing local capital projects. This 
assistance can take the form of establishing municipal finance corporations that run on 
commercial principles to lower the cost of borrowing by using the superior credit rating of 
the higher level government and municipal rating agencies to determine credit worthiness. 
•  An internal common market is best preserved by constitutional guarantees. National 
governments in developing countries have typically failed in this role. 
•  Intergovernmental transfers in developing countries undermine fiscal discipline and 
accountability while building transfer dependencies that cause a slow economic 
strangulation of fiscally disadvantaged regions.  Properly designed intergovernmental 
transfers on the other hand can enhance competition for the supply of public goods, fiscal 
harmonization, sub-national government accountability and regional equity. Substantial 
theoretical and empirical guidance on the design of these transfers is readily available.  
•  Periodic review of jurisdictional assignments is essential to realign responsibilities with 
changing economic and political realities. With globalization and localization, national 
government’s direct role in stabilization and macroeconomic control is likely to diminish   32
over time but its role in coordination and oversight is expected to increase as regimes and 
sub-national governments assume enhanced roles in these areas. Constitutional and legal 
systems and institutions must be amenable to timely adjustments to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  
•  Finally, contrary to a common misconception, decentralized fiscal systems offer a greater 
potential for improved macroeconomic governance than centralized fiscal systems. This is to 
be expected as decentralized fiscal systems require greater clarity in the roles of various 
players (centers of decision making) and transparency in rules that govern their interactions 
to ensure fair play.  
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Table 1. Fiscal Decentralization and Central Bank Independence 
Dependent Variable:  Central Bank Independence (CBI)   40
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N. Obs.  40  40  42 
R Square  .43  .43  .39 
White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. **,*, +, denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.   
 
u INF ERR PS INC CBI + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 β β β β α  
where: 
CBI:  Central Bank Independence (CBI) Cukierman et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 49 
(2002) 237–264.  
INC:  Log GDP per Capita 
PS:    An index of Political Stability was constructed using principal components analysis of 
the following variables:    
    GW:   Guerrilla Warfare (S17F3)  
   GC:   Government Crisis (S17F4) 
   Rev:   Revolution (S17F7) 
   Cd:    Copus d’etat (S21F1) 
   MCh:  Major constitutional changes  (S21F2) 
ERR:  Exchange Rate Regime. Information on the exchange rate regime is summarized by the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions for year 
2000.   
1= Exchange Arrangement with no separate legal tender 
2= Currency board Arrangement 
3= Conventional pegged system 
4= Pegged Exchange rate within horizontal bands 
5= Crawling pegs 
6= Crawling band 
7=Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate 
8=Independently Floating  
INF:   Consumer Prices annual Growth Rate 
No regression of qualitative decentralization variables could be conducted due to insufficient degrees of 
freedom, given only 13 observations commonly defined with CBI variable.  
 
 
Table 2.  Fiscal Decentralization and Monetary Management 
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 126.65  ** 
(5.67) 
    
N. Obs.  23  23    27    27     
Adj. R Square  .17 .19    .63    .62    
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. **,*, +, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.   
 
 
u CBS ERR CBI GDPC M + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 β β β β α  
 
where: 
M:    Monetary Supply-- M2 growth (WDI) 
GDPC:  log GDP per Capita 
CBI:  Central Bank Independence (Cukierman, 2000) 
ERR:  Exchange Rate Regime. Information on the exchange rate regime is summarized by the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions for year 
2000.   
1= Exchange Arrangement with no separate legal tender 
2= Currency board Arrangement 
3= Conventional pegged system 
4= Pegged Exchange rate within horizontal bands 
5= Crawling pegs 
6= Crawling band 
7=Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate 
8=Independently Floating  
CBS:  Central Gov. Budget Surplus (% of Exp.) 
u:   error term    42
Examining the effects of fiscal decentralization on price stability   
 
Two models were estimated. In the first model (Equation 1 below) a measure of inflation is the dependent 
variable. Results for this model are reported in table 17. In the second model (Equation 2 below) the 
dependent variable is a CPIA indicator of  Management of Inflation &  Macroeconomic Imbalances.  
Results for the second model are reported in table 18.     
 
(1)  u DEV UNP CBS ERR CBI GDPC I + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β β α  
where: 
I:  Inflation—GDP Deflator annual % growth (WDI)  
GDPC:  log GDP per Capita 
CBI:  Central Bank Independence 
ERR:  Exchange Rate Regime 
CBS:  Central Gov. Budget Surplus (% of Exp.) 
UNP:   Unemployment Total as a Percent of Labor Force  
DEV:     Development Dummy.  Dummy equal to one for high income OECD and Non-OECD 
countries as defined by the World Bank Development Indicators country categories.  
 
 
Table 3.  Fiscal Decentralization and Control of Inflation  
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Adj. R Square  .50  .52             
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. **,*, +, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.   
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Table 4.  Fiscal Decentralization and Management of Inflation &  Macroeconomic Imbalances 















     
Federal Dummy          






     




    




     
Unemployment          
LAC           
EECA          
AFR           




    
N. Obs.  27  27       
Adj. R Square  .21  .23       
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. **,*, +, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.     44
 
Table 5. Fiscal Decentralization and Quality of Debt Management 


























          































































N. Obs.  24  24  50  50   
Adj. R Square  .46  .46  .41  .41   
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. **,*, +, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.   
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Table 7.  Fiscal Decentralization and Quality of Fiscal Policies 








    




     
Federal Dummy          




     




    




     




    




     




    




     
AFR Dummy          




     




    
N. Obs.  27  27       
Adj. R Square  .45  .5       
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis.  
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Table 8: Fiscal Decentralization and Efficiency in Resource Mobilization 


























Federal Dummy         -.06 
(-.19) 




































































































N. Obs.  27  27  50  50  59 
Adj. R Square  .54  .54  .47  .47  .48 
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis.  
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Table 9.  Fiscal Decentralization and Prudent Use of Tax Monies  
Dependent Variable:  TE: Tax Effectiveness  (World Markets Research Center) Rescaled as TE’= 6 – TE; 







    




     
Federal Dummy          




     




    




     




    




     





    




     




    




     




    
N. Obs.  33  33       
Adj. R Square  .89  .90       
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis.  
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Examining  the effects of fiscal decentralization on Government Spending  
 
Two indicators of government spending patterns were examined: i) total government spending, and ii) 
budget balance. 
 
The  effects of decentralization on government spending were examined by the following estimation:  
 
(1)  u TR URB LP LINC DEC GS + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α  
 




GS:   Government Spending:  Overall Government  Expenditure as a percent of GDP. 
Source: IMF-GFS. 
LINC:  Log of Initial Gross Domestic Product per capita. 
LP:  Log Total Population  
URB:  Fraction of population living in areas defined as urban. 
TRANS:    Transfer Percentage of State-local general revenues that comes from grants. Source: 
IMF-GFS.  
 
Specification (1) draws on s specification used by Oates (1985)
5 results  are reported in table 8.  
Alternative variables used in specification (2) have been also used in empirical analysis of 
























                                                      
5 Oates, Wallace (1985) Searching for the Leviathan: An Empirical Study.  The American Economic 
Review, 75 (4) 748-753. 
6 Rodden, Jonathan  (2003) Reviving the Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government. 
International Organization 57, Fall 2003, pp+ 695–729 
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Table 10.  Fiscal Decentralization and Growth of Public Spending – Taming the Leviathan 
Dependent Variable:  Consolidated public expenditures as a percent of GDP 
























        (1)            (2) 
















   


















   4.91 ** 
(6.45) 
     4.40 **
(4.16) 
  4.0 ** 
(6.78) 




















Urbanization  .16 
(1.17) 
  .20 
(1.54) 
  -.52e-2 
(-.06) 
  -.65e-2 
(-.08) 
  .89e-2 
(.11) 
 
Transfers     15.63 * 
(2.24) 









Openness to Trade    .02 
(.32) 
  .02 
(.26) 
  .03 
(1.04) 
  .03 
(1.02) 
  .03 
(1.19) 










LAC Dummy    -5.3 
(-1.24) 
  -7.27 
(-1.65) 
      -7.48 *
(-2.02) 
  -7.55 * 
(-2.03) 
  -9.03** 
(-2.80) 










EECA Dummy    2.26 
(.54) 
  .06 
(.01) 
       6.71 * 
(2.48) 
  6.81 * 
(2.49) 
  2.49 
(.97) 




















N. Obs.  24  29  24  29  72  74  72  74  72  128 
Adj. R Square  .60 .49  .58  .43  .38  .47  .38  .47  .42 .42 
 Quantities in parenthesis are the White corrected t-statistics. **,*, +, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.   
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Budget Balance  
 




BB:  Deficit/Surplus as a percent of GDP. Source: International Financial Statistics IMF 
GDPG:   GDP growth Average for years 1990-2000 
OPEN:   Openness to Trade  
P65:   Share of Population over 65 
INF:  Consumer Prices annual growth % 
FINDEV:   Financial market development level, ‘financial depth’: The ratio of liquid liabilities of 
the financial system to GDP.  Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP. Liquid liabilities are 
also known as broad money, or M3. They are the sum of currency and deposits in the 
central bank (M0), plus transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and 
savings deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and 
securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time 
deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by 
residents. 
PS:    An index of Political Stability was constructed using principal components analysis of 
the following variables:    
    GW:   Guerrilla Warfare (S17F3)  
   GC:   Government Crisis (S17F4) 
   Rev:   Revolution (S17F7) 
   Cd:  Copus d’etat (S21F1) 
   MCh:  Major constitutional changes  (S21F2) 
DEV:  Development Dummy.  Dummy equal to one for high income OECD and Non-
OECD countries as defined by the World Bank Development Indicators country 
categories.  
R:          Regional Dummy Variables (LAC, EECA, AFR) 
 
Different combination of variables varies for each of the decentralization variables tested, based on 
Adjusted R squares and F tests of significance.    51
 
Table 11.  Fiscal Decentralization and Control over Deficits 
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Financial Market 
Development 

















   


















   






        




  -1.61 
(-.91) 
  -.88    -.16 
(-1.40) 
















N. Obs.  27  27  62  62  62  62  134  123 
Adj. R Square  .26  .30  .23  .25  .25 .26  .12  .13 
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. **,*, +, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.   
 
   52
Examining  the effects of fiscal decentralization on debt  management    
 
 
(1)  u R PS INF LINC DEC DGDP + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α  
 
(2)  u R PS INF LINC DEC MPD + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α  
 
where:  
DGDP: Total Debt to GDP ratio  (IMF-GFS). 1990-2000 average of year values of the ratio total 
(national plus subnational) debt to GDP.   
MPD:  Management of Public Debt (External and Domestic) CPIA-3. The index takes into 
account existence and amount of any arrears; whether and how long the country has been 
current on debt service; the maturity structure of the debt; likelihood of reschedulings; 
future external debt service obligations in relation to export prospects and reserves, and 
future domestic debt service in relation to fiscal balances and GDP. 
LINC: Log  of  Initial Gross Domestic Product per capita. 
INF  Consumer Prices annual growth % 
PS:    An index of Political Stability was constructed using principal components analysis of 
the following variables:    
    GW:   Guerrilla Warfare (S17F3)  
   GC:   Government Crisis (S17F4) 
   Rev:   Revolution (S17F7) 
   Cd:  Copus d’etat (S21F1) 
   MCh:  Major constitutional changes  (S21F2) 
R:           Regional Dummy Variables (LAC, EECA, AFR) 
 
Results for specification (1) are reported in  table 8 and results for specification (2)  are 
summarized in table 9.  53
 
Table 12. Fiscal Decentralization and Growth of Public Debt 



























Federal Dummy         .14 
(1.25) 






































































N. Obs.  23  23  55  55  84 
Adj. R Square  .43  .44  .31  .31  .08 
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. **,*, +, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively.     54
  
Table 13: Public Sector Management: Transparency and Accountability 
Dependent Variable:  Public Sector Management and Institutions (CPIA) 
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AFR Dummy            




         




       
N. Obs.  27  27           
Adj. R Square  .42  .48           
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis.  
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Table 14: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth  
Dependent Variable:  Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product 
Expenditure Dec.(Fraction 
Subnational expenditures)  


































Federal Dummy              -1.34 
(-1.28) 





















































































Central Asia Dummy 
























































N. Obs.  33  33  50  51  51  51  82 
Adj. R Square  .53  .55  .48  .48  .48  .48  .31 
 White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis.  
 
  
 